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ABSTRACT 
 
In power systems, economic dispatch, contingency analysis, and the detection of 
faulty equipment rely on the output of the state estimator.   Typically, state 
estimations are made based on the network topology information and the 
measurements from a set of sensors within the network.   The state estimates must 
be accurate even with the presence of corrupted measurements. Traditional 
techniques used to detect and identify bad sensor measurements in state 
estimation cannot thwart malicious sensor measurement modifications, such as 
malicious data injection attacks.   Recent work by Niemira (2013) has compared 
real and reactive injection and flow measurements as indicators of attacks.  In this 
work, we improve upon the method used in that work to further enhance the 
detectability of malicious data injection attacks, and to incorporate PMU 
measurements to detect and locate previously undetectable attacks.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The power grid is a complex network monitored and controlled by the SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system.  The SCADA system relies 
on a large number of sensors to collect data to feed into the state estimator in 
order to estimate the state of the power grid.  Accurate state estimates are crucial 
for economic dispatch, which determines power generation adjustments to match 
power demands, and for local grid operators to plan control actions in case of 
contingencies.  
 
State estimators can be either AC or DC.  The AC state estimator uses a nonlinear 
model, incorporating both real and reactive power flows and injections 
measurements.  The DC state estimator uses a linear model that consists of only 
real power flows and injections measurements.  The states consist of bus angles 
[1]. 
 
Ordinary bad data are generally caused by sensor misconfiguration or device 
failures.  This type of bad data is usually large and isolated, which can be detected 
by traditional bad data detectors with enough measurement redundancy.     
However, work by Liu et al. [2] showed that an attacker, with knowledge of 
network configurations, can inject coordinated malicious data that are coherent 
with the DC power flow models without being detected.  In [3], the potential 
success of DC attacks on real EMS (energy management system) software using a 
nonlinear model was shown.  In [4], the sensitivity of real and reactive power 
measurement residuals in a nonlinear state estimator to false data injection attacks 
based on a linearized model was examined.   
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In this work, we show that as the system gets larger, the method used in [4] will 
have diminished detectability due to measurement noise.   We improve upon that 
method to further enhance the detectability of malicious data injection attacks, to 
incorporate PMU measurements to detect and locate previously undetectable 
attacks.  
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2.  BACKGROUND 
 
 
2.1 Power Flow 
 
Power flow is a numerical analysis of the flow of electric power.  It analyzes 
power systems in steady-state operation.  The power flow solution also sets the 
initial condition for transient stability analysis.   
 
The AC power injection equations for real power P and reactive power Q at a bus 
i are: 
𝐏𝐢 = 𝐕𝐢∑ 𝐕𝐣[𝐆𝐢𝐣 𝐜𝐨𝐬(𝛉𝐢 − 𝛉𝐣) + 𝐁𝐢𝐣 𝐬𝐢𝐧(𝛉𝐢 − 𝛉𝐣)]
𝐧
𝐣=𝟏
  (1) 
𝐐𝐢 = 𝐕𝐢∑ 𝐕𝐣[𝐆𝐢𝐣 𝐬𝐢𝐧(𝛉𝐢 ⋅ 𝛉𝐣) − 𝐁𝐢𝐣 𝐜𝐨𝐬(𝛉𝐢 − 𝛉𝐣)]
𝐧
𝐣=𝟏
  (2) 
 
where n is the number of buses, G and B are the real and imaginary parts of the 
admittance matrix Y. 
 
In this work, the AC power flow analyses were performed on power system test 
cases from [5] using MATPOWER [6], a flexible and powerful tool for power 
system research, to get the measurement data needed for state estimation.   
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2.2 State Estimation 
 
State estimation uses measurements from network sensors to estimate the current 
state of the system.  There is usually redundancy in the number of sensors in case 
of sensor failure, and to improve accuracy.  Each sensor measurement becomes an 
equation to the state estimation solution.  The weighted least-squares errors 
estimation method is used, which relies on the solution of an overdetermined 
system of equations, in order to find the solutions that fit best.   The weighted 
least squares problem uses the following estimator: 
?̂? = (𝐇𝐓𝐖𝐇)−𝟏𝐇𝐓𝐖𝐳    (3) 
where W is a diagonal matrix whose elements are the measurement weights, H is 
the Jacobian matrix representing the network topology, z represents the sensor 
measurements, and ?̂? represents the estimated states of the system. 
 
2.3 Bad Data Detection 
 
Sensor measurements might be inaccurate due to device misconfiguration or 
device failures.  This type of bad data is usually large and isolated, which can be 
detected by traditional bad data detectors with enough measurement redundancy.  
Once the bad data has been found, the erroneous measurement is dropped as long 
as a set of basic measurements still exits [7].  A set of basic measurements is the 
minimum number of measurements needed to estimate the n state variables. 
 
Many methods for identifying and correcting bad measurements have been 
proposed.  A common approach [8], for detecting bad data is by looking at 
L2−norm of measurement residual defined as: 
‖𝐳 − 𝐇?̂?‖      (4) 
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where ?̂?  is the state estimate and z − H?̂?  is the measurement residual.  If the 
value of expression in (4) is greater than a certain threshold, it is assumed that bad 
data is present.  
 
2.4 Malicious Data Attacks 
 
Malicious data injection attacks are those in which an attacker manipulates the 
sensor measurements to induce a change in the estimated state ?̂? .  With 
knowledge of the network topology, bad data can be injected into DC state 
estimator without changing the measurement residual, thus cannot be detected by 
traditional bad data detection schemes.  In [2], Liu et al. present false data 
injection attacks that can bypass the bad data detection. 
 
2.4.1 Attack Principle 
Let a be an attack vector, the malicious data the attacker wants to add to the 
original measurement vector z.  Then 𝒛𝒂 = 𝒛 + 𝒂  represents the resulting 
modified measurement vector.  Theorem 1 in [2] shows that if the attack vector, a, 
was chosen to be equal to Hc, where c is the estimation error introduced, then 
resulting manipulated measurement 𝒛𝒂 = 𝒛 + 𝒂  can pass the bad measurement 
detection scheme described previous: 
‖𝐳𝐚 − 𝐇?̂?𝐛𝐚𝐝‖ = ‖𝐳 + 𝐚 − 𝐇(?̂? + 𝐜)‖      
= ‖𝐳 − 𝐇?̂? + (𝐚 − 𝐇𝐜)‖    
=‖𝐳 − 𝐇?̂?‖      
when  a = Hc     (5) 
where x̂bad is the state estimates using manipulated measurements za. 
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2.4.2 Attack Incentives 
In power system analysis, accurate state estimates are crucial for economic 
dispatch, which determines power generation adjustments to match power 
demands.  In [9], it was shown that a data attack on state estimation may disrupt 
the dispatch operation that controls the system state trajectory by perturbing the 
economic dispatch solution throughout multiple state estimation periods.  If the 
attack succeeds, it could mislead the control center into thinking that there will be 
an increase in demand.  As result, more expensive units will be used to increase 
the generation in order to match that demand; and the cost of generation will 
increase.  In [10], the impacts of malicious data attack on real-time electricity 
market were studied.  It was shown that since the real-time price is a function of 
state estimates, and the real-time locational marginal prices (LMP) is a function of 
data measured from meters, injecting bad data can affect prices in the real-time 
market.  If an attacker, with knowledge of the topology of the network, can inject 
malicious data to modify sensor measurements without being detected, then the 
attacker has the incentive and possesses the capability to alter the prices on the 
real-time electricity market to make a profit. 
 
Since the power grid is one of our nation’s most critical infrastructures, it is by 
itself an attractive attack target.  Adversaries may attempt to manipulate sensor 
measurements to cause equipment malfunction, monetary damage, or other 
malicious actions. 
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3.  DETECTION OF MALICIOUS DATA 
ATTACKS 
 
 
3.1 Previous Work and Approach 
 
This is a continuation of work in [4], and thus it is important to briefly describe its 
approach and results.   
 
3.1.1 Attacker Model 
It is assumed that the attacker has the network topology information, at least one 
column of the Jacobian matrix H, in static form available to formulate DC data 
injection attacks.  It is also assumed that the attacker has the ability to manipulate 
certain sensor measurements in order to launch an attack. 
 
3.1.2 Nonlinear Sensitivity Analysis 
Unlike traditional bad data, the malicious data injection attack is designed to fit 
the sum of squared residual test of a DC state estimator, minimizing the impact on 
measurement residues, thus avoiding detection.  When an AC state estimator is 
being used against attacks generated based on the DC model, the measurement 
residues will increase because the AC model accounts for reactive power as well 
as system losses which the DC model has neglected.   
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The measurements being considered are the real and reactive power injections and 
flows.  Since the impact of power losses increases with the square of current, the 
reactive flows would suffer more losses due to higher line reactance compared to 
line resistance; and since malicious data attack uses a linear model, reactive 
power estimates were expected to generate more measurement residues. 
 
3.1.3 Establishing Baseline 
In order to compare the measurement residues before and after the attack, baseline 
residual values had to be established.  Distribution of residuals due to noise was 
established using Monte Carlo trails that consist of  a normally distributed random 
variable with zero mean and standard deviation of 1% of the measurement values, 
which corresponds to 1% measurement noise,  resulting in z*: 
z* = z + n       (6) 
where n is the measurement noise vector, and z* is the sensor measurements 
including measurement noise.  AC state estimations were performed to record the 
measurement residues in order to establish a range of acceptable residue values.   
For any value higher than the value established, malicious data attack is assumed.   
A cutoff can be chosen based on the percentage of acceptable false alarms.  We 
will use 0% false alarms in our experiment, which means the cutoff chosen is the 
largest residue value of the established baseline.  
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3.1.4 Determine Detectability 
In order to determine if the system is under malicious data attack, the procedure 
from the last section was repeated along with added attack vectors from the H 
matrix, resulting in: 
z** = z + n + a             (7) 
where z** is the measurement vector that includes noise vector n and attack 
vector a.  In theory any combination of columns of DC H matrix can be served as 
an attack vector. 
 
The detectability of an attack is defined by the percentage of residual above the 
baseline cutoff established in the last section.  If 90% of residuals from the system 
under attack are above the cutoff value established earlier, then the attack is 
considered 90% detectable.   
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3.2 Evaluation of Approach for Larger Test Cases 
 
In [4], analysis was conducted on the IEEE 14-bus test case.  We would like to 
know if the results still hold for larger test cases such as the IEEE 30-bus and the 
IEEE 57-bus test cases; thus, analysis on these cases was conducted. 
 
3.2.1 Setup 
Analysis was conducted on the IEEE 30 and 57-bus test cases.  MATPOWER, a 
MATLAB package developed for power system simulation, was used to perform 
state estimations.  Distribution of residuals due to noise was established using 
Monte Carlo trails that consist of a normally distributed random variable with 
zero mean and standard deviation of 1% of the measurement values.  We will use 
0% false alarms in our experiment, which means the cutoff chosen is the largest 
residue value of the established baseline.  
 
3.2.2 Establishing Baseline 
Sum of squared residues of real and reactive flows and injections (PF, PG, QF, 
and QG) were recorded separately and as a weighted composite.  Histograms of 
the result were generated.  An example histogram for reactive power flows with 
5000 random noise samples is shown in Figure 3.1.  From these histogram bin 
counts, a cumulative density function (CDF) plot was created by normalizing the 
histogram to have an area of 1.  The cutoff was established by finding the largest 
sum of squared residue value of the CDF.  An example of CDF with cutoff for 
real power flows is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.1:  An example of histogram of sum of squared residues of reactive 
power flows (QF) for 5000 random noise vector samples. 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  An example CDF of sum of squared residues for real power flows 
(PF), with 1000 random noise vector samples.  The vertical line cuts the plot at 
100% percentile, indicating the baseline cutoff residue value. 
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3.2.3 Determine Detectability 
In theory any combination of columns of DC H matrix can be used to construct 
the attack vector.  For these experiments we have chosen to use only the columns 
such that the largest entry in each attack vector is scaled to the attack injection 
level.  The scale of attack vectors ranges from 10 MW to 50 MW in 100 MVA 
base.  For every distribution generated, the amount of residues above the baseline 
cutoff was computed, and the residual type (PF, PG, QF, QG, and weighted 
composite) with the highest detectability was then recorded.   
 
3.2.4 IEEE 30-Bus Test Case 
In Figure 3.3, the grouped bars showed the percentage of attacks detected by 
different residual types at 10 MW injection level.  For each measurement type, the 
size of residuals can be expected to vary greatly. 
Figure 3.3:  Grouped bars indicating percentage of each column DC H attack, 
from column 1 to column 30, detected at 10 MW attack injection level.  From left 
to right, the bars represent the residuals of:  the weighted composite, real power 
flow, real power generation, reactive power flow, and reactive generation. 
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Figure 3.4 shows the percentage of the total detectability of each attack column 
type detected, ranging from 10 to 50 MW attack injection level.  While the 
majority of attacks are detectable, attacks based on column 2, 3, 8, 21, and 22 of 
DC H matrix are below 50 percent detectable even at 50 MW injection level.  The 
total generation capacity of the IEEE 30-bus test case is about 335 MW.  50 MW 
injection is roughly 15% of total generation capacity.   
 
 
Figure 3.4:  Grouped bars indicating the percentage of detectability of each attack 
column type detected range from 10 to 50 MW attack injection level. 
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3.2.5 IEEE 57-Bus Test Case 
In Figure 3.5 below, the grouped bars showed the percentage of attacks detected 
by different residual types at 10 MW injection level. 
 
Figure 3.5:  Grouped bars indicating percentage of each column DC H attack, 
from column 1 to column 57, detected at 10 MW attack injection level.   
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Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of the total detectability of each attack column 
type detected, ranging from 10 to 50 MW attack injection level. The total 
generation capacity of the IEEE 57-bus test case is about 1975 MW.  At 50 MW 
injection levels, many column attacks remained undetected. 
 
 
Figure 3.6:  Grouped bars indicating the percentage of detectability of each attack 
column type detected range from 10 to 50 MW attack injection level. 
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3.2.6 Effect of Measurement Noise on Detectability 
Figure 3.7 shows the detectability of QF residual type on attack launched using 
column 14 of DC H matrix at 100 MW level.  The plot at the top contains the 
CDFs with 1% noise level.  The plot at the bottom contains the CDFs with 2% 
noise level.  At 1% noise level, we can clearly distinguish attack from noise, but 
at 2% noise it is no longer the case.  With larger percentage of measurement 
noise, the CDF plots will further stretch vertically, making the detection of 
malicious data injection more difficult. 
 
Figure 3.7:  Detectability of the same attack due to different measurement noise 
levels.  
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3.3 How to Improve the Previous Approach 
 
3.3.1 Note on Detectability 
Looking at the figures and data from Section 3.2, many would make the 
assumption that as the generation capacity increases, the detectability decreases, 
assuming the attack injection levels were kept constant.  The assumption is true, 
but it is not a major contributor causing attacks to become undetectable.  The 
major contributors to undetectability of many attacks are the random noise 
assigned to each sensor measurement and the size difference between measured 
quantities.   
 
For example: for the IEEE 57-bus test case, branch 1 has 102 MW flowing from 
bus 1 to bus 2, while branch 21 only has 0.67 MW flowing from bus 5 to bus 6.  If 
branch 21 was under malicious data attack, i.e. column 6 of DC H matrix was 
used along with 1% random noise samples, the attack residue from branch 21 has 
to be extremely large for the attack to be detectable.  The reason behind this is 
that the residue error created at branch 21(0.67 MW) is much smaller than the 
noise from branch 1 (102 MW) making it almost impossible to distinguish the bad 
data from noise.  Our data from Section 3.2, Figure 3.8 column 6, shows that the 
detectability of attack using column 6 of DC H matrix is about 50% at 50 MW 
attack injection level. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the CDFs of sum of squared residues of reactive power flows 
(QF) for branch 21 alone, without residues from other branches, set to have 1% 
noise with 200 random noise samples, with and without malicious data attack at 
30 MW injection level using column 6 of DC H matrix. 
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Figure 3.8:  CDFs of sum of squared residues of branch 21 for reactive power 
flows (QF), set to have 1% noise with 200 random noise samples, with and 
without malicious data attack at 30 MW attack injection level using column 6 of 
DC H matrix. 
 
Looking at Figure 3.8, by analyzing data from branch 21 alone, we can clearly tell 
that branch 21 was under malicious data attack because we are able to distinguish 
the sum of squared residues (in blue) from the 1% random noise samples (in red). 
To be thorough, Figure 3.9 shows the CDFs for weighted QF, sum of squared 
residues for branches 21 to 40. 
 
Figure 3.9:  CDFs of sum of squared residues for reactive power flows (QF), for 
branch 20 to branch 40, set to have 1% noise with 200 random noise samples, 
with and without malicious data attack at 30 MW attack injection level using 
column 6 of DC H matrix. 
 
Looking at Figure 3.9, one cannot distinguish residues below 0.035 from noise, 
thus making it about 10% detectable, which matches the data from Figure 3.6.  
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3.3.2  On Improving the Detectability of Malicious Data Attack 
It was shown in Section 3.3.1 that the amount of measurement noise and the size 
difference between measured quantities can have negative effect on the 
detectability of malicious data attacks.  As the system gets larger, it is crucial to 
come up with better detection schemes without consuming too much computing 
power.   
 
In this improved approach, the sum of squared residues of all branches connected 
to each individual bus was calculated, with 1% random noise but without attack to 
establish baseline cutoffs for each bus.  For example:  for the IEEE 14-bus test 
case, the sum of squared residues, from bus 1 to 14, was calculated for each 
residual type.  If the sum of squared residues of any bus exceeds the threshold 
determined by the baseline case, then we would assume an attack has occurred.  
The percentage of residues that exceed the baseline threshold is the percentage of 
attack being detected.   
 
This approach was used because the residue from a single branch may not be 
large enough to distinguish it from noise, and each column of DC H matrix 
modifies branch data going in and out of a bus.  For example:  attack constructed 
using column 14 of DC H matrix modifies branch data connected to bus 14.  As 
result, the residue to noise ratio should be the highest around bus 14.  More details 
and simulation results will be provided in the next chapter.  
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4.  IMPROVEMENT TO PREVIOUS 
METHOD 
 
 
4.1 Improving the Detectability of Malicious Data Attack 
 
It was shown in Section 3.3.1 that the amount of measurement noise and the size 
difference between measured quantities can have negative impact on the 
detectability of malicious data injection attacks.  As the system gets larger, it is 
crucial to come up with better detection schemes without consuming too much 
computing power.  In Section 3.3.2, a method of grouping the branch residues 
according to their connection to system buses was investigated.  
 
4.2 Locations of Malicious Data Injection Attack 
 
By grouping the residues according to their connection to network buses, if an 
attack was detected, then we were also able to limit the attack location to a few 
specific areas.  Figure 4.1 showed attacks detected at bus 13 and bus 14, while 
only branches going in and out of bus 14 where modified.  Even though the 
improved approach was unable to locate the attack at the exact location, it would 
save a lot of time in locating the sensors being tampered.  An attack that is 
constructed as a combination of columns of DC H matrix will be detected at 
multiple buses.  In the next section, simulation results of the improved approach 
will be shown.  
  
21 
 
4.3 Simulation Results 
 
In this section, simulation results will be shown.  In theory any combination of 
columns of DC H matrix can be used to construct the attack vector.  For these 
experiments we have chosen to use only the columns such that the largest entry in 
each attack vector is scaled to the attack injection level.  The scale of attack 
vectors ranges from 10 MW to 50 MW in 100 MVA base.  For every distribution 
generated, the amount of residue above the baseline cutoff was computed, and the 
residual type (PF, PG, QF, QG, and weighted) with the highest detectability was 
then recorded.   
 
4.3.1 Setup 
The setup was exactly the same as Section 3.2.1. 
 
4.3.2 Establishing Baseline 
Squared residues of each real and reactive flow and injection (PF, PG, QF, and 
QG) were recorded separately.  Sum of squared residues was calculated according 
to their connection to each system bus.  Histograms of the result were generated.  
From these histogram bin counts, a CDF plot was created for each bus.  The 
cutoffs were established by finding the largest sum of squared residue value of 
each CDF plot.  We would then have a percentage of detectability for each bus, 
and we take the largest percentage to be the percent of attack detected. 
For example, Figure 4.1 shows the CDF plots of PF residual type for IEEE 14-bus 
test case under 30 MW attack injection level using column 14 of DC H matrix.  
Since bus 14 has the most detectability, we would calculate the percentage of 
attack detected at bus 14, and use that number as the percent of overall attack 
detected. 
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Figure 4.1:  CDF plots of PF residual type for IEEE 14-bus test case under 30 
MW attack injection level using column 14 of DC H matrix. 
 
 
4.3.3 IEEE 14-Bus Test Case 
Figure 4.2 shows the largest percentage of detectability among PF, PG, QF, and 
QG residual types for each attack column range from 10 to 50 MW attack 
injection levels.  
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Figure 4.2:  Grouped bars indicating the percentage of detectability of each 
column attack column detected range from 10 to 50 MW attack injection levels. 
 
Comparing results obtained in this section to results obtained from [4], the 
detectability of attacks has been improved.  Since the 14-bus test case is small, the 
improvement is not obvious.  Table 4.1 shows the number of column attacks 
detected using the method from [4], and the method proposed in this chapter. 
 
Table 4.1: for IEEE 14-bus test case, the number of column attacks detected using 
method from [4], and the method proposed in this chapter.   
Attack Levels Method used in [4] Method proposed 
10 MW 7 7 
30 MW 11 11 
50 MW 11 12 
 
For the IEEE 14-bus test case, at 50 MW attack injection level, column attacks 7 
and 10 are still not detectable.  We will talk about how to detect these attacks in 
the later chapter.  
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4.3.4 IEEE 30-Bus Test Case 
Figure 4.3 shows the largest percentage of detectability among PF, PG, QF, and 
QG residual types for each attack column range from 10 to 50 MW attack 
injection levels.  
 
Figure 4.3:  Grouped bars indicating the percentage of detectability of each 
column attack column detected range from 10 to 50 MW attack injection levels. 
 
Compared to results obtained from 3.2.4 using method from [4], the detectability 
of attacks has been greatly improved, especially at lower attack injection levels.  
Table 4.2 shows the number of column attacks detected using the method from 
[4], and the method proposed in this chapter. 
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Table 4.2: For IEEE 30-bus test case, the number of column attacks detected 
using method from [4], and the method proposed in this chapter.  The 
detectability of attacks has been improved, especially at lower attack injection 
levels.   
Attack Levels Method used in [4] Method proposed 
10 MW 8 15 
20 MW 15 23 
30 MW 20 25 
40 MW 20 26 
50 MW 22 26 
 
For the IEEE 30-bus test case, at 50 MW attack injection level, column attacks 2, 
3, 21, and 22 were still not detectable.   
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4.3.5 IEEE 57-Bus Test Case 
Figure 4.4 shows the largest percentage of detectability among PF, PG, QF, and 
QG residual types for each attack column range from 10 to 50 MW attack 
injection levels for the IEEE 57-bus test case.   
 
Figure 4.4:  Grouped bars indicating the percentage of detectability of each 
column attack column detected range from 10 to 50 MW attack injection levels. 
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Compared to results obtained from 3.2.5 using the method from [4], the 
detectability of attacks has been once again improved.  Table 4.3 shows the 
number of column attacks detected using the method from [4], and the method 
proposed in this chapter.   
 
Table 4.3: For IEEE 57-bus test case, the number of column attacks detected 
using method from [4], and the method proposed in this chapter.   
Attack Levels Method used in [4] Method proposed 
10 MW 4 20 
20 MW 11 27 
30 MW 17 34 
40 MW 24 41 
50 MW 28 48 
 
The method used in [4] will perform poorly as the bus system gets even larger due 
to the fact that column attacks are relatively sparse; the sum of squared error from 
the noise vector will outweigh the attack, thus making it more difficult to 
distinguish an attack from sensor noise. 
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5.  DETECTION OF MALICIOUS DATA 
ATTACKS USING PMU 
 
 
5.1 On Attacks that Are Difficult to Detect 
 
We have noticed during our previous simulations that there were still some 
column attacks left undetected.  As a result, the use of phasor measurement unit 
(PMU), or synchrophasor, to detect maliciously injected data was investigated.   
 
PMU is considered as one of the most important measuring devices in the future 
of power systems.  When placed on a network bus, it measures the magnitude and 
phase angle of voltage and current in real time.  PMU relies on a GPS time signal 
for time-stamping of the power system information.  Assuming the PMU 
measurements were unaltered by the attacker, then we can compare these 
measurements directly against the state estimates without relying on the residues.   
 
Since the PMUs rely on GPS time signal as a reference to measure phase angles 
while the previous test cases rely on a single reference bus angle, comparing them 
directly does not make sense.  Instead the angle differences between two buses 
were compared.  For example:  If an attack was injected using column 10 of DC 
H matrix, by comparing the angle differences, of bus 1 and bus 10, of PMU 
measurements against those from state estimation, malicious data injection attacks 
could be detected at much lower injection levels, and the PMU measurements can 
also provide bad data localization. 
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5.2 PMU Approach 
 
5.2.1 Setup 
The analysis was conducted on the IEEE 14, 30 and 57-bus test cases.  
MATPOWER was used to perform state estimations.   Distribution of noise was 
established using Monte Carlo trails that consist of a normally distributed random 
variable with zero mean and standard deviation of 1% of the measurement values.  
The cutoff chosen was the largest angle difference between two buses from the 
established baseline, which means 0% false alarm.  Calculation of residues was 
no longer needed here because the PMU measurements were assumed to be 
secure and accurate.  Therefore if the state estimates did not match closely to the 
PMU measurements, i.e. attack injections were distinguishable from noise, then 
the attack was detected. 
 
5.2.2 Establishing Baseline 
In order to calculate the angle difference between two buses, a reference bus was 
needed.  Since the reference buses for the IEEE test cases were chosen to be bus 
1, the same buses were used to calculate the buses angle difference from PMU 
measurements, which means PMUs were placed at those reference buses.  The 
bus angle difference from PMU measurements and the angle difference from the 
state estimates were recorded separately.  Histograms of the result were 
generated.  From these histogram bin counts, a CDF plot was created for each 
bus.  The cutoffs were established by finding the largest angle difference of each 
CDF plot.  A percentage of detectability for each bus was calculated, and the 
largest percentage was chosen to be the percent of attack detected. 
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5.3 Simulation Results 
 
In this section, simulation results will be shown.  In theory any combination of 
columns of DC H matrix can be used to construct the attack vector.  For these 
experiments we have chosen to use only the columns such that the largest entry in 
each attack vector is scaled to the attack injection level.  The scale of attack 
vectors range from 5 MW to 15 MW in 100 MVA base.   
 
5.3.1 Attack on the Reference Bus 
Since a bus is being used as the reference bus, if the reference bus was attacked, 
the PMU placed at the reference bus would not be able to detect such attack, but 
all other phase angle differences were expected to change thus making the attack 
even more obvious.  Figure 5.1 shows what happens when bus 1 of IEEE 14-bus 
test case was attacked using column 1 of DC H matrix at 10 MW injection level.  
 
Figure 5.1:  CDFs of PMU measurements and state estimates of bus angles for 
IEEE 14-bus test case when the reference bus was attacked under 10 MW 
injection level using column 1 of DC H matrix. 
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Figure 5.2 shows what happens when bus 10 of IEEE 14-bus test case was 
attacked using column 10 of DC H matrix at 10 MW injection level.  In [4], it was 
shown that even at 80 MW injection level this specific attack was undetectable.   
 
Figure 5.2:  CDFs of PMU measurements and state estimates of bus angles for 
IEEE 14-bus test case when the reference bus was attacked under 10 MW 
injection level using column 10 of DC H matrix. 
 
Even at only 10 MW attack injection level, the CDF for bus 10 clearly showed 
that there was something wrong.  The exact percentage of detectability will be 
shown in the next section. 
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5.3.2 IEEE 14-Bus Test Case 
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of detectability of column attacks ranging from 5 
to 15 MW attack injection levels for the IEEE 14-bus test case.  Attacks were 
generated using only columns of DC H matrix.  At 15 MW injection levels, all 
column attacks were detected. 
 
Figure 5.3:  Percentage of detectability of column attacks ranging from 5 to 15 
MW attack injection levels.  Attacks were generated using only columns of DC H 
matrix from the IEEE 14-bus test case. 
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5.3.3 IEEE 30-Bus Test Case 
Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of detectability of column attacks ranging from 5 
to 15 MW attack injection levels for the IEEE 30-bus test case.  Attacks were 
generated using only columns of DC H matrix.  At only 5 MW injection levels, all 
column attacks were detected. 
 
Figure 5.4:  Percentage of detectability of column attacks ranging from 5 to 15 
MW attack injection levels.  Attacks were generated using only columns of DC H 
matrix from the IEEE 30-bus test case. 
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5.3.4 IEEE 57-Bus Test Case 
 
Figure 5.5:  Percentage of detectability of column attacks ranging from 5 to 15 
MW attack injection levels.  Attacks were generated using only columns of DC H 
matrix from the IEEE 57-bus test case. 
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Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of detectability of column attacks ranging from 5 
to 20 MW attack injection levels for the IEEE 57-bus test case.  Attacks were 
generated using only columns of DC H matrix.  At 20 MW injection levels, all 
column attacks were detected.  The total real power generation of the IEEE 57-
bus test case is about 1300 MW.  20 MW is about 1.6% of total real power 
generated. 
 
5.4 Localization of Malicious Data Attacks using PMU 
 
In section 5.3, it was shown in Figure 5.1 that if the reference bus was under 
attack, the CDF plots of PMU measurements and state estimates will have large 
angle differences at other buses.  Figure 5.2 showed that PMU placed on bus 10 
of the IEEE 14-bus test case could successfully detect attacks launched using 
column 10 of the DC H matrix at 10 MW injection level, which was not 
detectable even at 80 MW injection level using the method in [4].  Figure 5.2 also 
showed that none of the other PMUs has detected large bus angle differences, 
which means the location of the attack has been exposed. 
 
Previously, even if an attack was detected using the method in [4], the location of 
the attack cannot be derived from the sum of squared of attack residues.  It would 
take much time to locate and fix the damage created by the attacker.  Using the 
approach proposed in Chapter 4, the detectability of attacks was improved; the 
approach also limits the location of the attack to a few specific areas.  For 
example, Figure 4.1 showed attacks detected at bus 13 and bus 14, while only 
branches going in and out of bus 14 were modified.  Even though the approach in 
Chapter 4 was unable to locate the attack at the exact location, it would save a lot 
of time in locating the sensors being tampered with compare to the method used 
in [4].  By incorporating PMU measurements, the attacks can be pinpointed at the 
36 
 
exact bus locations at much lower attack injection level.  This is significant 
because it has improved the attack detectability at much lower attack injection 
levels, it can save a lot of time finding the attack location, and it provides an extra 
layer of protection; i.e., in order for the attacks to succeed, the attacker has to 
tamper with the sensors as well as the PMU measurements. 
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6.  PMU PLACEMENT 
 
 
6.1 Where to Place the PMUs 
 
Given limited resources, the PMUs need to be strategically placed along with the 
use of the approach from Chapter 4 to achieve the best protection without running 
exhaustive simulations.  For example: if a minimum attack injection level is 
given, i.e. any attack above or equal to such level should be detected, then we 
want to know where to place the PMUs to maximize protection against malicious 
data attacks, and how many PMUs are needed to complement the method from 
Chapter 4.   
 
6.1.1 Centrality Measures 
The network centralities from [11] were first investigated in order to identify the 
important nodes in the system where PMUs should be strategically placed in 
terms of system vulnerabilities.  The centralities did not complement the work in 
[4] or the approach from Chapter 4.  One of the reasons could be that the work in 
[11] did not incorporate system generation and load, which are important in 
determining the amount of real and reactive flows and injections given the 
admittance matrix Y.  
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6.1.2 Using Residues for PMU Placements 
To complement the work in [4], baseline cutoffs for each of the residual types 
(PF, PG, QF, and QG) were found the same way as in Section 3.2.2.  Then with 
specified attack injection levels and 0% measurement noise, attacks generated 
using the columns of the DC H matrix were launched.  The sum of squares of 
attack residues for each residual type can be calculated by running the state 
estimation once.  Since there is no noise, the state estimates would not vary by 
running state estimation multiple times.  Then the sum of squared residues were 
sorted from smallest to largest; the smallest was the most vulnerable to malicious 
data injection attack, and the bus that the column attack had modified was the 
location where the PMU needed to be placed.  Note: PMU placement on the 
reference bus is required in order to calculate bus angle difference. 
 
In order to complement the improved approach from Chapter 4, baseline cutoffs 
for each of the residual types (PF, PG, QF, and QG) were found the same way as 
in Section 4.3.2 by grouping the branches according to their connections to each 
system bus.  Then with specified attack injection levels and 0% measurement 
noise, squared of attack residues for each residual type were found by running the 
state estimation once.  The residues were then grouped according to their 
connection to each system bus.  For each attack launched, we would have a sum 
of squared residue for each bus.  The largest value among the buses was recorded 
as the attack residue.  Attacks were formed using columns of DC H matrix.  The 
sum of squares of attack residues for each column of DC H matrix were then 
sorted from smallest to largest, the smallest was the most vulnerable to malicious 
data injection attack, and is where the PMU needed to be placed.   
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6.1.3 Number of PMUs Needed 
In Section 6.1.2, we introduced a way to strategically place the PMUs to enhance 
malicious data detectability.  Since the PMUs were used to complement the 
approach from Chapter 4, the PMU placements need to be stopped as soon as the 
attack residues are large enough to be detected by the approach alone.  By 
comparing the attack residues with the baseline cutoffs determined from Section 
6.1.2, the attacks that will be detected by the approach from Chapter 4 can be 
roughly determined.   
 
In order to distinguish an attack from noise, the largest baseline cutoff from the 
CDF with no attack but noise has to be smaller than the smallest attack residue 
from the CDF with attack and noise.  By running the column attack only once 
without noise, the CDF curve for the attack vector injected was nonexistent.  As 
such, a coefficient was needed to be divided by the attack residues in order to find 
a rough estimate of the leftmost attack residue value.  The point of this is to verify 
that the baseline cutoff, i.e. the largest residue value due to noise alone, is smaller 
than the smallest attack residue, thus making the difference between noise and 
attack distinguishable without running exhaustive simulations.   
 
For the purpose of simulation, the coefficient is chosen to be the baseline cutoff 
divided by the baseline median.  How to determine a better coefficient to find the 
smallest attack residue value of the CDF plot without running exhaustive 
simulation could be a topic for future work. 
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6.2 PMU Placements 
 
From Section 5.3.4, it has been shown that for the IEEE 57-bus test case, all 
attacks generated using the columns of the DC H matrix can be detected at 20 
MW attack injection levels if PMUs are placed on the buses.  In this chapter, the 
PMU placements that complement the approach from Chapter 4, for attacks 
generated using the columns of the DC H matrix ranging from 20 to 50 MW, will 
be shown.   
 
6.2.1 IEEE 14-Bus Test Case 
Table 6.1 shows where to place the PMUs to further improve the detectability of 
malicious data injection attacks if the approach from Chapter 4 has been used 
without running exhaustive simulations.  The smaller the number assigned to a 
bus, the more vulnerable that bus.  A zero means no PMU was needed.  Since the 
difference between two bus angles was measured, PMU placement on the 
reference bus was required, which is bus 1 in this case. 
 
Simulation in Chapter 4 used 500 random noise samples for the IEEE 14-bus test 
case, which means AC state estimation was performed 500 times to establish the 
baseline cutoff and 7000 times to simulate the detectability of 14 column attacks 
for an arbitrary attack injection level.  In order to simulate the detectability of 14 
column attacks ranging from 20 to 50 MW injection levels, a total of 28500 AC 
state estimations on the IEEE 14-bus test case were needed.  As the test case gets 
larger, such a method of finding where to place the PMUs is not efficient. 
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Table 6.1:  PMU placement for the IEEE 14-bus test case to complement 
detection approach used in Chapter 4 without running exhaustive simulations. 
 Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Bus 6 Bus 7 
20 MW 1 4 0 0 0 0 2 
30 MW 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
40 MW 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
50 MW 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 Bus 8 Bus 9 Bus 10 Bus 11 Bus 12 Bus 13 Bus 14 
20 MW 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
30 MW 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
40 MW 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
50 MW 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 
Using the method proposed in this chapter, AC state estimation was performed 
500 times to establish the baseline cutoff and 14 times to simulate the 
detectability of 14 column attacks for an arbitrary attack injection level.  In order 
to simulate the detectability of 14 column attacks ranging from 20 to 50 MW 
injection levels for PMU placement, a total of 556 AC state estimations on the 
IEEE 14-bus test case were needed.   
 
Comparing the results from Table 6.1 with simulation results from Chapter 4, the 
buses that are the most vulnerable to malicious data injection attack were found, 
the placement order for bus 7 and bus 10 was switched at the 20 MW injection 
level. 
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6.2.2 IEEE 30-Bus Test Case 
 
Table 6.2: PMU placements for the IEEE 30-bus test case to complement 
detection approach used in Chapter 4 without running exhaustive simulations. 
 Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Bus 6 Bus 7 
20 MW 1 4 2 0 0 0 6 
30 MW 1 4 2 0 0 0 6 
40 MW 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
50 MW 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 
 Bus 8 Bus 9 Bus 10 Bus 11 Bus 12 Bus 13 Bus 14 
20 MW 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 
30 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Bus 15 Bus 16 Bus 17 Bus 18 Bus 19 Bus 20 Bus 21 
20 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
30 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
40 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
50 MW 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 Bus 22 Bus 23 Bus 24 Bus 25 Bus 26 Bus 27 Bus 28 
20 MW 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 MW 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 MW 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 MW 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Bus 29 Bus 30      
20 MW 0 0      
30 MW 0 0      
40 MW 0 0      
50 MW 0 0      
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Table 6.2 shows where to place the PMUs to further improve the detectability of 
malicious data injection attacks if the approach from Chapter 4 has been used 
without running exhaustive simulations. The smaller the number assigned to a 
bus, the more vulnerable was that bus.  A zero means no PMU was needed.  Bus 1 
was used as reference bus. 
 
Simulation in Chapter 4 used 500 random noise samples for the IEEE 30-bus test 
case, which means AC state estimation was performed 500 times to establish the 
baseline cutoff and 15,000 times to simulate the detectability of 30 column attacks 
for an arbitrary attack injection level.  In order to simulate the detectability of 30 
column attacks ranging from 20 to 50 MW injection levels, a total of 60500 AC 
state estimations on the IEEE 30-bus test case were needed.   
 
Using the method proposed in this chapter, AC state estimation was performed 
500 times to establish the baseline cutoff and 30 times to simulate the 
detectability of 30 column attacks for an arbitrary attack injection level.  In order 
to simulate the detectability of 30 column attacks ranging from 20 to 50 MW 
injection levels for PMU placement, a total of 620 AC state estimations on the 
IEEE 30-bus test case were needed.   
 
Comparing the results from Table 6.2 with simulation results from Chapter 4, at 
20 MW attack injection level, there should have been a PMU placement for bus 
28, but it was missing, so a redundant PMU was placed on bus 13 instead.   
Attack generated using the 28
th
 column of the DC H matrix was above 90% 
detectable using the method from Chapter 4.  For attack injection levels ranging 
from 30 to 50 MW, the buses that are the most vulnerable to malicious data 
injection attack were found correctly. 
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6.2.3 IEEE 57-Bus Test Case 
Table 6.3 shows where to place the PMUs to further improve the detectability of 
malicious data injection attacks if the approach from Chapter 4 has been used 
without running exhaustive simulations. Bus 1 was used as reference bus. 
 
Table 6.3: The order of PMU placements for the IEEE 57-bus test case to 
complement the detection approach used in Chapter 4 without running exhaustive 
simulations. 
Bus Protection Order Bus Number 
20 MW 1 12 44 48 38 22 23 2 
37 5 28 10 36 27 3           50 
8 53 13 6 47 7 52 9 
16 35 17 11 32 33 
30 MW 1 12 44 48 22 23 38 2 
37 28 5 10 36 27 3           8 
50        53 6 11 13 35 32 33 
40 MW 1 12 44 48 22 23 2 38 
37 28 10 5 3 36 53          50 
6          33 
50 MW 1 12 44 48 22 23 2 38 
37 28 10 36 
 
Simulation in Chapter 4 used 500 random noise samples for the IEEE 57-bus test 
case, which means AC state estimation was performed 500 times to establish the 
baseline cutoff and 28,500 times to simulate the detectability of 57 column attacks 
for an arbitrary attack injection level.  In order to simulate the detectability of 30 
column attacks ranging from 20 to 50 MW injection levels, a total of 114,500 AC 
state estimations on the IEEE 57-bus test case were needed.   
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Using the method proposed in this chapter, AC state estimation was performed 
500 times to establish the baseline cutoff and 57 times to simulate the 
detectability of 57 column attacks for an arbitrary attack injection level.  In order 
to simulate the detectability of 57 column attacks ranging from 20 to 50 MW 
injection levels for PMU placement, a total of 728 AC state estimations on the 
IEEE 30-bus test case were needed.   
 
Table 6.4: The order of PMU placements for the IEEE 57-bus test case 
determined using simulation results from Chapter 4. 
Bus Protection Order Bus Number 
20 MW 1 12 38 44 48 22 23 5 
37 2 28 8 36 53 10       50 
3 27 13 6 47 7 52        9 
16 35 17 11 14 15 
30 MW 1 12 44 48 22 23 38 37 
5 2 28 10 36 27 3          8 
50 47 7 52 53 9 6  
40 MW 1 12 44 48 22 23 38 2 
37 28 5 10 3 27 36        8 
50 MW 1 12 44 22 48 23 2 38 
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Table 6.4 shows the actual PMU placements needed after simulation by running 
exhaustive AC state estimations from Chapter 4.  Comparing the results from 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 along with simulation results from Chapter 4, at 20 MW 
attack injection level, there should have been two PMUs placed on bus 14 and 15, 
but instead two PMUs were placed on bus 32 and 33.   Attacks generated using 
the 14
th
 and 15
th
 columns of DC H matrix were above 95% detectable using the 
method from Chapter 4.   
46 
 
At 30 MW attack injection level, there should have been four PMUs placed on 
bus 7, 9, 47, and 52, but instead five PMUs were placed on bus 11, 13, 32, 33, and 
35.   Attacks generated using the 7
th
, 9
th
, and 52
nd
 columns of the DC H matrix 
were above 95% detectable using the method from Chapter 4.  The 47
th
 had 
detectability above 90%. 
 
At 40 MW attack injection level, there should have been two PMUs placed on bus 
8 and 27, but instead four PMUs were placed on bus 6, 33, 50, and 53.   Attacks 
generated using the 8
th
 and 27
th
 columns of DC H matrix were above 95% 
detectable using the method from Chapter 4.   
 
At 50 MW attack injection level, the buses that are the most vulnerable to 
malicious data injection attack were found correctly but three extra PMUs were 
placed on bus 10, 28 and 36.    
 
For the IEEE 57-bus test case, most of the PMU placements were correct.  For 
those missed locations, the simulation from Chapter 4 shows detectability above 
90%  
 
 
 
 
  
47 
 
6.3 Protecting the Basic Set 
 
In [7], the authors showed that protecting a strategically selected set of sensor 
measurements or state variables prevented attackers from launching unobservable 
attacks.  The PMU placements introduced in this chapter could be used to 
complement the approach used in Chapter 4.  For example:  Figure 4.2 showed 
that attacks on bus 7 and 10 were difficult to detect even at 50 MW attack 
injection level using the approach from Chapter 4, so in order to complement the 
approach, PMUs were needed.  Table 6.1 showed that at 50 MW attack injection 
level, PMUs were needed on bus 1, 7, and 10.  This is important because instead 
of protecting a basic set of sensor measurements, or the equal number of state 
variables, the number of state variables that required protection has now been 
limited to only three. 
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7.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
 
 
This work followed the idea from [4] that, by using an AC state estimator against 
attacks generated using a linear model, measurement residues were introduced.  
The difference between the measurement residues was leveraged to detect 
malicious data injection attacks.   The detection method was tested on larger bus 
systems, and was shown to have diminished sensitivity as the system got larger 
due to sensor noise introduced by larger measurements, which outweighed the 
residues generated by smaller measurements that were being attacked. 
 
To improve detectability for larger bus cases, a method of grouping the branch 
residues according to their connection to network buses was developed.  This 
method has shown improved detectability for larger bus cases.  Like the method 
used in [4], a few attacks were difficult to detect even at higher attack injection 
levels.  PMU was incorporated, and was shown to not only detect the attacks at 
lower attack injection levels, but also provide attack localization.  If 
measurements have been tampered with, then the PMUs placed at the bus nearby 
would detect the abnormality.   
 
Future work could include the detection of attacks that were difficult to detect 
without relying on the PMUs or development of an algorithm that distinguishes 
residual distributions from ordinary bad data. 
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